This is the second part in my series to talk about what I gathered from the recent readings. Since last year, there have been increased amount of noise from ASEAN countries about China's increased assertiveness in the area. The most vocal of those countries is Vietnam. That really is not surprising given that China's most recent major conflict was with Vietnam in 1979. This entry will attempt to look back on the role of the air force in security situations between the 2 countries.
By the late 70s, the Chinese regime was feeling increasingly encircled by Soviet Union and its allies. After Vietnam defeated the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia (China's only remaining ally in the region), China decided that it had to teach Vietnam a lesson. I won't go through the actual conflict here, since others would know about it much better than I do. However, I will use this conflict to demonstrate the inadequacy of PLAAF at that time.
After the Soviet-China split in the 50s, the Chinese aerospace industry basically had no advancement until well into the 80s, when it started cooperation with the West. The majority of its air force at the time of conflict were J-6 (Mig-19C). A crashed J-6 from this conflict showed that it had very little difference from the original variant of Mig-19C. At the same time, the radar on the J-5/6 were so poor that they were less capable than civilian aircraft radar, which were design for the purpose of avoiding collision. In many cases, human eyes could see targets before the radar could pick them up. On top of that, China was still using the extremely archaic PL-1 (K-5 copy) and PL-2 (K-13 copy) at the time of the conflict. Soviet AF had already found that PL-1 is completely ineffective in battle and PL-2 could not be used in cloud. So PLAAF was basically sending out a 1950s era fighter jet that could not pick out any enemy fighter jet. And even if it managed to pick out an enemy fighter jet, it had no way of shooting it down by missiles.
Another major factor against PLAAF was the decline in training as a result of cultural revolution. Back in 1964, PLAAF pilots were averaging around 122 hours of flight per year, which was comparable to the countries under Warsaw Pact. By 1966, they were only averaging 23 hours 45 minutes a year of training. Much of the training manual was also destroyed as part of the cultural revolution, so the pilots were not getting proper training even when they had flight time. According to the writer of the book, only 1% of PLAAF pilots were capable of night flight under complex weather condition by the end of the cultural revolution. So at the time of the conflict, PLAAF was sending out unqualified pilots who did not get adequate training and who could not fly during bad weather condition or at night time.
At that time, PLAAF simply could not support the ground troops in the ways that we now envision an air force would do. PLA used a combination of the air force and its SAM/AAA units to prevent VNAF from establishing air dominance. Throughout the entire conflict, PLAAF fighter jets were ordered to stay within China's boundary to stay out of VN SAMs. While some small transports and helicopter were used to move troops/goods into the battlefield, the J-6/7 just stuck with doing patrols along the border. The army never got any kind of close air support from its air force. This conflict pushed PLAAF to re-emphasize training programs that had been neglected for too long. And despite a few successful cooperation projects, the majority of PLAAF modernization did not start until the 90s.
Since 1979, most of the arguments between China and Vietnam have taken place over the Spratlys. There was a minor skirmish between the two navies in 1988. After which, China started its aerial refueling program and developed the H-6U tankers in order to support J-8 to gain air superiority over South China Sea. And over the past 20 years, the balance of air power has really shifted toward PLAAF. Due to modernization during these years, PLAAF can now send 30 aircraft of different types of to South China Sea with the support of aerial refueling and AEWC&C. According to the author, PLAAF can now be used to apply pressure on neighbouring countries like Vietnam to not get out of hand. For example, VNAF decided to order Su-30s from Russia, because its aircraft were repeatedly getting locked on by J-10s during exercises. I don't know if that's completely true, but there has been a lot of rumours recently flying around Chinese forums that J-10s were locking onto VNAF Su-30s in Vietnam's most recent military exercise.
So as we look back on the performance of PLAAF in the 1979 vs now, it is easy to see how much things have changed. Back then, PLAAF could even provide air denial for PLA, because it was kept within the borders. Now, PLAAF can be quietly used as a tool apart from the army to show hard power. I'm not here to advocate this kind of behaviour or another, but to show the change in philosophy within PLA.
Sunday, August 21, 2011
Saturday, August 20, 2011
The legacy of Liu Huaqing
Recently, I've read a couple of books regarding the development of Chinese air force. More than anything else, this one book by a well known poster on Chinese bbs has really changed many perceptions I've had regarding the modernization of PLAAF doctrine and training. I would say that anyone who has frequented top Chinese language forums would know who I'm referring to. Over the next few weeks, I plan to write several entries on different aspects of PLAAF modernization. The first topic that I decided to make is the legacy of Liu Huaqing, since he is forever linked to the Chinese Aircraft Carrier program.
If you do a search of Liu Huaqing, you are most likely going to see articles describing him as the father of modern Chinese navy. His following quote has accompanied him everywhere
Liu served as the commander of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1987. After that, he served as the deputy chairman of the powerful CMC from 1989 to 1997. During his time as the commander of PLAN, Liu advocated acquiring a medium-sized and conventional-power carrier for operations over the Spratlys. At that time, Jiang Zemin's administration supported soft power in dealing with neighbours, so PLAN development concentrated mostly on the Taiwan scenario. More importantly, PLA budget simply could not support the cost of an aircraft carrier and associated air wing. At the same time, PLAN surface ship build up did not start until 2002, so having a carrier group was not possible. However, I think Liu did get PLAN thinking about expanding its reach from just the shores. Up to that point, PLA was stuck in the Mao era mindset of "people's army". The role of the AF was to achieve air denial rather than air dominance. The role of the navy was just to provide coastal defense. Even up to the start of this century, some in the army still thought that no nation can establish continued air dominance. That really is an astonishing thought when one thinks about how much US air dominance had determined Operation Desert Storm and over Kosovo.
What most people don't know is Liu's influence in the modernization of PLAAF after he became the deputy chairman of CMC. Liu was not only pushing for the modernization and increased power projection for PLAN, but he was also doing so for the air force. When Liu first got to his position in 1989, he was probably surrounded by many army generals in the upper echelon of PLA. Even though China's relationship with Soviet Union had warmed since Gorbachev took over, the army was still gripped with the threat of Soviet encirclement. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the majority of advanced Soviet equipment became available for China. China had previously been offered Su-27 by Gorbachev's regime, but more weapons became available as the Russian military industrial complex faced the threat of collapse. In fact, the Russians brought T-72 MBTs, T-80U MBTs, SPH systems, SAMs, IFVs to display to PLA. PLA was probably 20 years behind Russia in ground weapon technology at that time. Considering these PLA generals spent the past 10 years developing plans against those front line T-80U tanks, it must have been a godsend for them to be able to buy these weapons. However, China had a limited military budget at that time, so they had to be picky about which system to get from the Russians.
Liu showed his foresight at this point. He believed that the gap between China and the leading standards in the world was the smallest in the army. He also got support from China's industrial complex, who did not believe China needed to import whole systems from Russia. Liu received support from Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to go for fighter jets, SAMs and Smerch MLRS instead of tanks and IFVs. Liu and others also realized that China's aerospace industry needed advancement. So instead of just buying Su-27s, he pushed for licensed local production and transfer of technology.
Looking back on it now, Liu was absolutely right in his vision. The Chinese industrial complex managed to advance to the point where it can produce numerous world class weapon systems despite not reaching ToT for T-80U, BMP-3 and numerous other systems. On the other had, the Chinese military aerospace industry has advanced quite far. Not only was PLAAF able to obtain the rights to produce a 4th generation fighter locally, but it has obtained experience in developing heavy fighter jet. I would say that China would not be able to develop a heavy fighter jet like J-20, if it did not first learn how to locally build Su-27s. At the same time, SAC have been able to develop J-15 based on the Su-27 platform. So Liu's push not only produced tremendous benefit for the air force but also naval aviation. Of all of the military leaders of his generation, Liu stands alone in his role in not only the modernization of PLAN, but also PLAAF.
If you do a search of Liu Huaqing, you are most likely going to see articles describing him as the father of modern Chinese navy. His following quote has accompanied him everywhere
“Without an aircraft carrier, I will die with my eyelids open; the Chinese Navy needs to build an aircraft carrier,”
Liu served as the commander of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1987. After that, he served as the deputy chairman of the powerful CMC from 1989 to 1997. During his time as the commander of PLAN, Liu advocated acquiring a medium-sized and conventional-power carrier for operations over the Spratlys. At that time, Jiang Zemin's administration supported soft power in dealing with neighbours, so PLAN development concentrated mostly on the Taiwan scenario. More importantly, PLA budget simply could not support the cost of an aircraft carrier and associated air wing. At the same time, PLAN surface ship build up did not start until 2002, so having a carrier group was not possible. However, I think Liu did get PLAN thinking about expanding its reach from just the shores. Up to that point, PLA was stuck in the Mao era mindset of "people's army". The role of the AF was to achieve air denial rather than air dominance. The role of the navy was just to provide coastal defense. Even up to the start of this century, some in the army still thought that no nation can establish continued air dominance. That really is an astonishing thought when one thinks about how much US air dominance had determined Operation Desert Storm and over Kosovo.
What most people don't know is Liu's influence in the modernization of PLAAF after he became the deputy chairman of CMC. Liu was not only pushing for the modernization and increased power projection for PLAN, but he was also doing so for the air force. When Liu first got to his position in 1989, he was probably surrounded by many army generals in the upper echelon of PLA. Even though China's relationship with Soviet Union had warmed since Gorbachev took over, the army was still gripped with the threat of Soviet encirclement. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the majority of advanced Soviet equipment became available for China. China had previously been offered Su-27 by Gorbachev's regime, but more weapons became available as the Russian military industrial complex faced the threat of collapse. In fact, the Russians brought T-72 MBTs, T-80U MBTs, SPH systems, SAMs, IFVs to display to PLA. PLA was probably 20 years behind Russia in ground weapon technology at that time. Considering these PLA generals spent the past 10 years developing plans against those front line T-80U tanks, it must have been a godsend for them to be able to buy these weapons. However, China had a limited military budget at that time, so they had to be picky about which system to get from the Russians.
Liu showed his foresight at this point. He believed that the gap between China and the leading standards in the world was the smallest in the army. He also got support from China's industrial complex, who did not believe China needed to import whole systems from Russia. Liu received support from Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to go for fighter jets, SAMs and Smerch MLRS instead of tanks and IFVs. Liu and others also realized that China's aerospace industry needed advancement. So instead of just buying Su-27s, he pushed for licensed local production and transfer of technology.
Looking back on it now, Liu was absolutely right in his vision. The Chinese industrial complex managed to advance to the point where it can produce numerous world class weapon systems despite not reaching ToT for T-80U, BMP-3 and numerous other systems. On the other had, the Chinese military aerospace industry has advanced quite far. Not only was PLAAF able to obtain the rights to produce a 4th generation fighter locally, but it has obtained experience in developing heavy fighter jet. I would say that China would not be able to develop a heavy fighter jet like J-20, if it did not first learn how to locally build Su-27s. At the same time, SAC have been able to develop J-15 based on the Su-27 platform. So Liu's push not only produced tremendous benefit for the air force but also naval aviation. Of all of the military leaders of his generation, Liu stands alone in his role in not only the modernization of PLAN, but also PLAAF.
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Review of Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles
I recently had a chance to read "Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles". This book is the fifth instalment in the series “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development” and can be found here on Amazon
In the past, I have found works by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and the good folks at China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) to be of the highest quality and this book was no exception. This book not only includes contributions from professors at CMSI, but also serving/retired commander/officers, military attaché to China, policy makers and numerous China contributors from different think tanks. It does a great job of understanding China's motivations/intentions, while fairly examining PLA's capabilities and training. For those seeking for a greater understanding of China's air force, space development and Second Artillery Command, I think this is a must read. More than anything else, it drew from a wide range of primary research and Chinese sources which have not appeared in any other unclassified Western publications. I believe that this book shows that we can all learn a lot more about PLA and its intentions by going through thousands of Chinese publications and news articles.
I want to point out several sections that really stood out to be me. In part 1, this book took at really good look at the existing Chinese doctrine in gaining air dominance over Taiwan straits through PLAAF and 2nd artillery. In particular, Wayne Ulman's section on PLAAF strategy, training and modernization is extremely well done. I though Kevin Pollpeter and Anthony Mastalir both have very informative sections on PLA's desire to have stronger space presence and limit American space dominance. Garth Hekler's piece on Chinese EW effort was very well researched, because it really looked at all of China's open sources and summarized the parts that Chinese researchers have focused on. It really talked about what Chinese researchers think have contributed to US success and China's own research on those areas. Dennis Belasko's piece on helicopter provided a lot of solid information on PLA helicopter training. It is a very detailed piece on the areas that PLA helicopter force has grown in and also the areas that PLA still need more training/improvement. I also appreciated the extensiveness that Lanzit and Chen talked about the join operational training and exercises between naval aviation and PLAAF with PLAN ships. While we have seen a lot of pictures of such cooperation, the authors do a good job of describing the kind of maritime strike missions conducted in these joint operations. Ron Christman's section of China's Second Artillery Corps is simply excellent. The most interesting part describes SAC's operational doctrine, preparation and training facing an overwhelming opposition (US) in the Taiwan scenario.
On top of that, I was pleasantly surprised by all of the new information/analysis that I found in this book regarding to China's ASBM program. I have read many differently analysis on ASBM (including several by CMSI), but this book really provided a much more comprehensive look than anything else I have read. The discussions on subjects like conflict escalation of ASBM, hard kill vs soft kill and non-carrier targets were very refreshing.
So, for all those who are interested in learning more about China's Air Force, space development and Second Artillery, I think this book would be an excellent read.
In the past, I have found works by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and the good folks at China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) to be of the highest quality and this book was no exception. This book not only includes contributions from professors at CMSI, but also serving/retired commander/officers, military attaché to China, policy makers and numerous China contributors from different think tanks. It does a great job of understanding China's motivations/intentions, while fairly examining PLA's capabilities and training. For those seeking for a greater understanding of China's air force, space development and Second Artillery Command, I think this is a must read. More than anything else, it drew from a wide range of primary research and Chinese sources which have not appeared in any other unclassified Western publications. I believe that this book shows that we can all learn a lot more about PLA and its intentions by going through thousands of Chinese publications and news articles.
I want to point out several sections that really stood out to be me. In part 1, this book took at really good look at the existing Chinese doctrine in gaining air dominance over Taiwan straits through PLAAF and 2nd artillery. In particular, Wayne Ulman's section on PLAAF strategy, training and modernization is extremely well done. I though Kevin Pollpeter and Anthony Mastalir both have very informative sections on PLA's desire to have stronger space presence and limit American space dominance. Garth Hekler's piece on Chinese EW effort was very well researched, because it really looked at all of China's open sources and summarized the parts that Chinese researchers have focused on. It really talked about what Chinese researchers think have contributed to US success and China's own research on those areas. Dennis Belasko's piece on helicopter provided a lot of solid information on PLA helicopter training. It is a very detailed piece on the areas that PLA helicopter force has grown in and also the areas that PLA still need more training/improvement. I also appreciated the extensiveness that Lanzit and Chen talked about the join operational training and exercises between naval aviation and PLAAF with PLAN ships. While we have seen a lot of pictures of such cooperation, the authors do a good job of describing the kind of maritime strike missions conducted in these joint operations. Ron Christman's section of China's Second Artillery Corps is simply excellent. The most interesting part describes SAC's operational doctrine, preparation and training facing an overwhelming opposition (US) in the Taiwan scenario.
On top of that, I was pleasantly surprised by all of the new information/analysis that I found in this book regarding to China's ASBM program. I have read many differently analysis on ASBM (including several by CMSI), but this book really provided a much more comprehensive look than anything else I have read. The discussions on subjects like conflict escalation of ASBM, hard kill vs soft kill and non-carrier targets were very refreshing.
So, for all those who are interested in learning more about China's Air Force, space development and Second Artillery, I think this book would be an excellent read.
Thursday, August 11, 2011
What Varyag means
As I'm sure everyone have heard by now, Varyag began sea trials 2 days ago. We have not seen pictures of its sea trial, but have seen pictures of the empty dock and the no fly/sail zone that China has established (seen below). Before continuing, I do apologize if this piece becomes a little nonsensical, because I wrote this at quite a late hour.
When I look at this moment, I see this as a representation of China's growing affluence and power. Back when WWII just finished, the Nationalists had plans to build aircraft carriers to reflect its new found status as one of the members of the Permanent Five in the United Nations. Due to their corruption and incompetence, they lost out to the far smaller and less well equipped Communist forces. When the Communists took over, China was a country that had been pillaged for over 100 years by outside forces. Back then, China was poor and did not have any modern industry to speak of. In the 50s, Soviets provided technical aid in 156 industries for China. For all of the follies of China's adoption of communism, that was probably the second most significant event in China's modernisation. From that point onward until the death of Mao, the Chinese society was stuck in a constant period of ideological struggle, war and famine. By the time Deng Xiaoping came to power, China was completely broke. And despite the Soviet encirclement of China at that time and its desire to "teach Vietnam a lesson", Deng cut back on military expenditure year after year. Deng had been a member of PLA since 1927. And despite been exiled twice by Mao, PLA's support for Deng allowed him to grab power ahead of Mao's appointed successor Hua Guofeng. The war against Vietnam in 1979 showed the inadequacies in PLA. Even so, Deng recognized that economical development and modernization through engaging the leading world economies were the only way out. Years of putting communist ideology and militarism on top did not make China a stronger country. Deng's method of humble/pragmatic foreign policy, reduced diplomatic footprint and emphasis in joining the world economy have resulted in over 30 years of uninterrupted economic growth and national power.
And now that we get to 2011, China has the money, the will, the shipbuilding prowess and naval technology to not only refit Varyag, but also build a few aircraft carriers. I think when one looks at China, it can support a large enough military budget to have a couple of aircraft carriers groups without been a burden to the economy. It can build such a fleet relatively cheaply, because it has a very competitive shipbuilding industry and can procure most of the subsystem locally.
Militarily speaking, it already has enough modern ships to form the escorts of a carrier group. It will also have domestic naval fighter, trainers and helicopters that it can operate on a carrier. Everything is in place for PLAN to start the formation of its first carrier group.
And contrary to some claims, China does have many reasons to have aircraft carriers. It is the second largest economy in the world and will probably become the largest in the next 25 years. It has soft power to influence near every country, but does not have the hard power to get to most of those countries. It is humiliating for some Chinese people that China still does not have a carrier when even a small country like Thailand has one. It has learnt from USN that aircraft carrier could be a sign of soft power. PLAN has already been parading the new Type 920 hospital ship and the Type 071 LPD around the countries in Indian Ocean. Aircraft carrier will be the ultimate display of power that China can deploy in humanitarian crisis. And obviously, I have also talked the military hard power needs like protecting its sea lanes and overseas investments.
I do have certain caution for China as it moves forward into carrier age. Deng Xiaoping's policies have paved ways for years of development, but China is still a poor country when one looks at its average income level. As the world's economy is teetering on entering another economic downturn, China's overly investment dependent economy will suffer. China should develop a blue water fleet with the goal of protect its economic interest and citizens around the world rather than trying to take control from America. It has already seen the strong reactions from ASEAN countries to its more aggressive foreign policy. Although I do think that China will be eventually accepted by these countries as the top dog in this region, it should not fall in the trap of using military power to interfere with other countries' policies.
So as Varyag starts its sea trials, I hope that China will continue Deng's policy of putting its people first. The emergence of the first Chinese carrier is a demonstration of China's growing economic strength and industrial base. While this is a good time for the Chinese leadership and Chinese people to celebrate, China should continue to focus on economical development above all.
When I look at this moment, I see this as a representation of China's growing affluence and power. Back when WWII just finished, the Nationalists had plans to build aircraft carriers to reflect its new found status as one of the members of the Permanent Five in the United Nations. Due to their corruption and incompetence, they lost out to the far smaller and less well equipped Communist forces. When the Communists took over, China was a country that had been pillaged for over 100 years by outside forces. Back then, China was poor and did not have any modern industry to speak of. In the 50s, Soviets provided technical aid in 156 industries for China. For all of the follies of China's adoption of communism, that was probably the second most significant event in China's modernisation. From that point onward until the death of Mao, the Chinese society was stuck in a constant period of ideological struggle, war and famine. By the time Deng Xiaoping came to power, China was completely broke. And despite the Soviet encirclement of China at that time and its desire to "teach Vietnam a lesson", Deng cut back on military expenditure year after year. Deng had been a member of PLA since 1927. And despite been exiled twice by Mao, PLA's support for Deng allowed him to grab power ahead of Mao's appointed successor Hua Guofeng. The war against Vietnam in 1979 showed the inadequacies in PLA. Even so, Deng recognized that economical development and modernization through engaging the leading world economies were the only way out. Years of putting communist ideology and militarism on top did not make China a stronger country. Deng's method of humble/pragmatic foreign policy, reduced diplomatic footprint and emphasis in joining the world economy have resulted in over 30 years of uninterrupted economic growth and national power.
And now that we get to 2011, China has the money, the will, the shipbuilding prowess and naval technology to not only refit Varyag, but also build a few aircraft carriers. I think when one looks at China, it can support a large enough military budget to have a couple of aircraft carriers groups without been a burden to the economy. It can build such a fleet relatively cheaply, because it has a very competitive shipbuilding industry and can procure most of the subsystem locally.
Militarily speaking, it already has enough modern ships to form the escorts of a carrier group. It will also have domestic naval fighter, trainers and helicopters that it can operate on a carrier. Everything is in place for PLAN to start the formation of its first carrier group.
And contrary to some claims, China does have many reasons to have aircraft carriers. It is the second largest economy in the world and will probably become the largest in the next 25 years. It has soft power to influence near every country, but does not have the hard power to get to most of those countries. It is humiliating for some Chinese people that China still does not have a carrier when even a small country like Thailand has one. It has learnt from USN that aircraft carrier could be a sign of soft power. PLAN has already been parading the new Type 920 hospital ship and the Type 071 LPD around the countries in Indian Ocean. Aircraft carrier will be the ultimate display of power that China can deploy in humanitarian crisis. And obviously, I have also talked the military hard power needs like protecting its sea lanes and overseas investments.
I do have certain caution for China as it moves forward into carrier age. Deng Xiaoping's policies have paved ways for years of development, but China is still a poor country when one looks at its average income level. As the world's economy is teetering on entering another economic downturn, China's overly investment dependent economy will suffer. China should develop a blue water fleet with the goal of protect its economic interest and citizens around the world rather than trying to take control from America. It has already seen the strong reactions from ASEAN countries to its more aggressive foreign policy. Although I do think that China will be eventually accepted by these countries as the top dog in this region, it should not fall in the trap of using military power to interfere with other countries' policies.
So as Varyag starts its sea trials, I hope that China will continue Deng's policy of putting its people first. The emergence of the first Chinese carrier is a demonstration of China's growing economic strength and industrial base. While this is a good time for the Chinese leadership and Chinese people to celebrate, China should continue to focus on economical development above all.
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Varyag officially acknowledged
Today, China's Defense Ministry finally admitted to the existence of refitting the Vayarg carrier. Here is the Xinhua link on the subject.
Here is a Reuters Article.
And here are the highlights of the news conference with Defense Ministry. I wish to get a clip of the news conference and watch it over later, but here are the interesting points.
Here are some of the Varyag pictures taken in the past couple of days. Looking at the work on the deck, it looks like the refitting is close to being done.
Here is a Reuters Article.
And here are the highlights of the news conference with Defense Ministry. I wish to get a clip of the news conference and watch it over later, but here are the interesting points.
- Some anonymous source said 2 more aircraft carriers are being built at JN shipyard in Shanghai. (I'm not 100% on the number or the location, but it sounds quite plausible)
- Geng did not give an official sea trial date and said that it is not related to South China Sea drama.
- Geng said the task of training carrier-borne aircraft pilots is under the way. He also said that China is relying on its own effort to train naval pilots. (This is interesting, because I've read that the first Chinese pilots already got to Brazil.)
- Varyag is used for research, experiment and training. (I think it will have be eventually used for more than that, but we will see)
Here are some of the Varyag pictures taken in the past couple of days. Looking at the work on the deck, it looks like the refitting is close to being done.
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Upcoming weeks
Hi guys,
I'm currently going through some books on PLA and will be working on something pretty comprehensive. So, you might not see something out here for a couple of weeks. The goal is to have several instalment of material on the evolution of PLAAF in the next few months. I think it will be worth the wait once I do have everything completed.
Feng
I'm currently going through some books on PLA and will be working on something pretty comprehensive. So, you might not see something out here for a couple of weeks. The goal is to have several instalment of material on the evolution of PLAAF in the next few months. I think it will be worth the wait once I do have everything completed.
Feng
Sunday, July 3, 2011
PLAN activity outside of Varyag
It looks like the recent report that Varyag was going to start sea trial in July 1st did not turn out to be true. There was a report from Jamestown that the sea trial was pushed back to sometimes in August. I will just go with the approach of wait and see when it will first sail off. From the pictures I saw a couple of days ago, there is still a bunch of stuff lying on the deck.
While the entire attention was on Varyag, there has also been quite a bit of activity around different shipyards.
From the two photos below, we see the first submarine launched in the new JN shipyard. The old JN shipyard had been producing Song submarines during its production run. I had speculated that the production variants of Yuan submarines (aka Type 039B) are also getting produced in JN. Now, we have confirmation that is the case. We can also see that the 4th 052C is about to be launched.
At HD shipyard, we can see continued works on its 5th 054A and 2nd Type 071. I have previously posted the modules of the 3rd Type 071. I've recently read that the 4th Type 071 is also quickly taking shape in the shipyard. It shows that Type 071 is really becoming a big part of PLAN's future plans.
At the same time, China is about to send its 9th flotilla to Gulf of Aden. It will be sending 169 (052B), 569 (054A) and 885 (replenishment ship) from the south sea fleet.
Interestingly enough, 885 has been fitted with a new 30 mm naval gun in the front and the back of this ship (as you can see from the 1st and 3rd 885 photos).
Another development that has received a lot of my attention recently has been the refitting program on the Type 052 Luhu class destroyers. This was the first class of PLAN ships that attempted to incorporate Western design ideas and subsystems. In fact, 112 was the first ship that was fitted with gas turbine engines. It received two LM-2500 engines before the arms embargo came into place. As a result of this, 113 had to be fitted with GT-25000, which has since become the gas turbine of choice for the 052 series of destroyers. These two ships were last updated in 2003/4 when the original YJ-81 missiles were replaced by the YJ-83 missiles and PJ-33A was replaced by a design with reduced RCS features. These two ships entered into shipyards again more than a year ago to undergo further modernization.
By the summer of 2009, we saw 112 parked outside of HuDong shipyard (113 was undergoing a similar change in another shipyard). By the end of that year, we saw it completely ripped apart. In fact, several people even speculated that 112 was about to be scrapped. The rest of us wondered what kind of major changes they were planning for 112. Some work was done while parked outside, but majority of the refitting work were done after being moved into the dry dock in April of this year. The diagram below shows the modernized 052.
The pictures below shows 113 before the refitting
Afterward
The pictures below show which parts of 112 was changed.
Hard to see with it covered and the main gun taking up most of this picture, but the ASW rocket was changed from 12-tubed RBU-1200 to the 6-tubed Type 87 (commonly found on recent PLAN ships)
The Type 726 multi-purpose decoy launcher has been installed on the side of the bridge. The Type 76A guns and Type 347G targeting radar have been removed and replaced by a EO tracker.
SR-64 has been installed on the aftmast. The Type 518 long range surveillance radar has been replaced by the Type 517 radar.
Two Type 730 CIWS has replaced the two Type 76A guns and the Type 347G targeting radar. We also see what appears to be two new satcom bulb installations.
Another part that was changed was the variable depth sonar installed on this ship. We used to be able to see the towed variable depth sonar through openings at the back, but it has now been sealed up and replaced with a similar TAS to the one on 054A.
Through the two years that it has parked outside of HD shipyard. A number of us have wondered why such changes are needed when the more capable 054A were mass produced very cheaply. As we have seen this with all of their refitting works on Type 051 and Type 053 ships, PLAN does not like to just decommission outdated ships. Even as a generation of blue water ships come into service, the older ships are kept around to play smaller roles in coastal defense. With 052's modernization, it will probably be kept around for another 15 years. We can also see that HH-7 and PJ-33A will most likely be kept around for a while. China produced a lot of missiles and rounds for these systems and is in no rush to replace them on the older ships.
While the entire attention was on Varyag, there has also been quite a bit of activity around different shipyards.
From the two photos below, we see the first submarine launched in the new JN shipyard. The old JN shipyard had been producing Song submarines during its production run. I had speculated that the production variants of Yuan submarines (aka Type 039B) are also getting produced in JN. Now, we have confirmation that is the case. We can also see that the 4th 052C is about to be launched.
At HD shipyard, we can see continued works on its 5th 054A and 2nd Type 071. I have previously posted the modules of the 3rd Type 071. I've recently read that the 4th Type 071 is also quickly taking shape in the shipyard. It shows that Type 071 is really becoming a big part of PLAN's future plans.
At the same time, China is about to send its 9th flotilla to Gulf of Aden. It will be sending 169 (052B), 569 (054A) and 885 (replenishment ship) from the south sea fleet.
Interestingly enough, 885 has been fitted with a new 30 mm naval gun in the front and the back of this ship (as you can see from the 1st and 3rd 885 photos).
Another development that has received a lot of my attention recently has been the refitting program on the Type 052 Luhu class destroyers. This was the first class of PLAN ships that attempted to incorporate Western design ideas and subsystems. In fact, 112 was the first ship that was fitted with gas turbine engines. It received two LM-2500 engines before the arms embargo came into place. As a result of this, 113 had to be fitted with GT-25000, which has since become the gas turbine of choice for the 052 series of destroyers. These two ships were last updated in 2003/4 when the original YJ-81 missiles were replaced by the YJ-83 missiles and PJ-33A was replaced by a design with reduced RCS features. These two ships entered into shipyards again more than a year ago to undergo further modernization.
By the summer of 2009, we saw 112 parked outside of HuDong shipyard (113 was undergoing a similar change in another shipyard). By the end of that year, we saw it completely ripped apart. In fact, several people even speculated that 112 was about to be scrapped. The rest of us wondered what kind of major changes they were planning for 112. Some work was done while parked outside, but majority of the refitting work were done after being moved into the dry dock in April of this year. The diagram below shows the modernized 052.
The pictures below shows 113 before the refitting
Afterward
The pictures below show which parts of 112 was changed.
Hard to see with it covered and the main gun taking up most of this picture, but the ASW rocket was changed from 12-tubed RBU-1200 to the 6-tubed Type 87 (commonly found on recent PLAN ships)
The Type 726 multi-purpose decoy launcher has been installed on the side of the bridge. The Type 76A guns and Type 347G targeting radar have been removed and replaced by a EO tracker.
SR-64 has been installed on the aftmast. The Type 518 long range surveillance radar has been replaced by the Type 517 radar.
Two Type 730 CIWS has replaced the two Type 76A guns and the Type 347G targeting radar. We also see what appears to be two new satcom bulb installations.
Another part that was changed was the variable depth sonar installed on this ship. We used to be able to see the towed variable depth sonar through openings at the back, but it has now been sealed up and replaced with a similar TAS to the one on 054A.
Through the two years that it has parked outside of HD shipyard. A number of us have wondered why such changes are needed when the more capable 054A were mass produced very cheaply. As we have seen this with all of their refitting works on Type 051 and Type 053 ships, PLAN does not like to just decommission outdated ships. Even as a generation of blue water ships come into service, the older ships are kept around to play smaller roles in coastal defense. With 052's modernization, it will probably be kept around for another 15 years. We can also see that HH-7 and PJ-33A will most likely be kept around for a while. China produced a lot of missiles and rounds for these systems and is in no rush to replace them on the older ships.
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